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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I develop a comparison between 
the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their 
concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have 
acknowledged the affinity between James’ early 
psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late 
development of James’ philosophy is often considered in 
opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. 
This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-
dual dimension of experience that precedes the 
functional division into subject and object, thus 
contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the 
dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that 
the later “genetic” development of phenomenology 
converges with some central aspects of James’ radical 
empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology 
leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as 
a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes 
the subject-object duality and is at the base of the 
process of co-constitution of the subject and the object 
in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl 
conceives of the impressional core of experience as 
structured by formal conditions that depend on the 
concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this 
reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology 
can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading 
to the development of the doctrine of pure experience 
as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare the concepts of 
experience that are developed in the philosophies of 
Edmund Husserl and William James. Various authors 
have stressed the affinities between James’ early 
psychology, as presented in the Principles of Psychology 
(James 1958, hereafter referred to as Principles), and 
Husserl’s phenomenology (see Schutz 1941; Gurwitsch 
1946; Wilshire 1969; Kessler 1978). In fact, certain ideas 
presented in James’ Principles prefigure central features 
of Husserl’s phenomenology. In particular, the starting 
point of James’ inquiry in the Principles is the 
epistemological dualism of knower (subject) and known 
(object), conceived of as an essential character of mental 
states. This dualism is expressed by the notions of 
“conception” and “cognitive function”, which can be 
likened to Husserl’s concept of intentionality (see Schutz 
1941; Gurwitsch 1946; Wilshire 1969: 32). This common 
starting point of the philosophies of Husserl and James is 
also developed in similar ways. For example, James’ 
distinction between “topic” and “object of thought” is 
very close to Husserl’s distinction between the “object 
which is intended” and the “object as it is intended” (see 
Schutz 1941; Gurwitsch 1946). Furthermore, James’ idea 
that the various parts of the stream of thought are 
surrounded by fringes, which also account for the unity 
of consciousness and the unity of the object, anticipates 
the phenomenological concept of horizon
1
. For these 
reasons, Husserl’s phenomenology can be conceived of 
as a “radicalization” (see Gurwitsch 1946) of James’ 
programmatic dualism through the investigation of the 
fundamental correlation subjective-objective. 
However, the same reasons that lead us to 
acknowledge this continuity between James’ Principles 
and Husserl’s phenomenology also lead us to find a 
tension between Husserl’s phenomenology and James’ 
later doctrine of pure experience, which is presented in 
the Essays in Radical Empiricism (James 1912, hereafter 
referred to as Essays). This is because, in contrast to the 
analysis of the dual structure of experience by means of 
notions such as “cognitive function” (in James) and 
“intentionality” (in Husserl), the doctrine of pure 
experience achieves a non-dual dimension of experience 
that precedes the functional division into subject and 
object. 
For this reason, various authors have stressed the 
opposition between James’ late philosophy and Husserl’s 
phenomenology (see Gurwitsch 1946: 163; Wilshire 
1969; Kessler 1978). In contrast to this reading, I shall 
argue that Husserl’s genetic development of 
phenomenology also reaches a non-subjectivist concept 
                                                 
1
 Husserl (1970: 234) claims that James recognized the 
“phenomena of horizon […] under the title of ‘fringes’” 
(see Wilshire 1969: 34). 
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of experience that is near to James’ doctrine of pure 
experience. This is because the genetic “deepening” of 
phenomenology finds in the flow of primal impressions a 
fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the 
subject-object duality, being at the base of the process 
of co-constitution of the subject and the object in 
reciprocal dependence. At the same time, reading 
James’ view in the light of Husserl’s phenomenology 
allows us to address an open question in the doctrine of 
pure experience. This view could be interpreted as a 
form of metaphysical realism, i.e. as a doctrine about 
ultimate reality and, specifically, as a metaphysical form 
of neutral monism. However, the metaphysical reading 
of James’ view contrasts with the rejection of the 
absolutistic and trans-empirical claims of metaphysics in 
James’ empiricist and pragmatist philosophy. I shall 
argue that the comparison with Husserl’s 
phenomenology leads us to develop a non-metaphysical 
reading of the doctrine of pure experience. In fact, 
Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience 
as structured by formal conditions that depend on the 
concrete constitution of the subject of experience. I shall 
argue that the phenomenological account of the 
intertwining of form and matter of experience 
complements James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to 
the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a 
form of empirical and not metaphysical realism.
2
 
 
1. The doctrine of pure experience 
 
James conceives of the doctrine of pure experience as a 
“rearrangement” in philosophy and as a 
Weltanschauung into which his mind has grown for 
many years (James 1912: 40). This doctrine goes beyond 
the epistemological dualism of subject-object that was at 
the heart of the Principles and it arises from a radical 
gaze into experience that enters into contact with its 
                                                 
2
 With these notions I refer to the distinction, which is 
present in Kant, between two notions of reality: 
empirical (i.e. relative to the cognitive relation) and 
metaphysical (i.e. absolute, “in itself”). 
originary nature, before any conceptualization and 
theorization has taken place. This inquiry finds a “pure” 
dimension of experience that precedes the functional 
distinction between subject and object. According to 
James, the subject and the object of experience are 
constituted by series of pure experiences and the 
distinction between them is merely practical, depending 
on the function that they have in a certain context, 
which we thereby call “physical” or “mental”. Pure 
experiences are thus situated at the intersection of the 
subject and the object, being the neutral (James 1912: 
25, 123) dimension from which the subjective and the 
objective are constructed for practical purposes. In 
James’ view, the reification of this functional duality is 
the source of old philosophical dilemmas that can be 
solved when we recognize the non dual nature of pure 
experience:  
 
“My thesis is that if we start with the supposition 
that there is only one primal stuff or material in 
the world, a stuff of which everything is 
composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure 
experience,' then knowing can easily be 
explained as a particular sort of relation towards 
one another into which portions of pure 
experience may enter. The relation itself is a part 
of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes 
the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the 
knower, the other becomes the object known.” 
(James 1912: 4) 
 
This view constitutes an account of knowledge and, 
above all, of perception. In particular, it constitutes an 
alternative to both the representative theories and the 
common-sense theories of perception (James 1912: 52). 
In the light of the doctrine of pure experience, “external” 
objects as well as the “internal” images of the objects, 
turn out to be constituted of the same “stuff”, i.e. by 
pure experiences. According to James, each segment of 
experience is made "of just what appears, of space, of 
intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what 
not." (James 1912: 26). These “sensations” are 
qualitative elements that are neutral, being neither 
absolutely subjective nor absolutely objective but rather 
the matter out of which the subjective (mental state) 
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and the objective (physical reality) is made of (James 
1912: 215). Pure experiences are therefore immediately 
accessible qualitative elements of experience or 
“qualia”. James presents us with an original account of 
qualia that is different from both the internalism and the 
externalism about qualities that can be found in various 
theories of perception.
3
 
 
2. Neutral monism and the metaphysics  
    of pure experience 
 
The doctrine of pure experience is, foremost, a theory of 
knowledge. At the same time, James presents it as a 
metaphysics, defining pure experiences as the “stuff of 
which everything is composed” and the “materia prima 
of everything” (James 1912: 4; 138). These passages can 
be read as referring to a metaphysical doctrine 
concerning ultimate being and, in particular, to a form of 
neutral monism. Some authors (e.g. Banks 2010) 
consider James as one of the main proponents of neutral 
monism. In fact, James presents his view as a form of 
“monism” that is centred on the concept of a “primal” 
and “neutral” reality (James 1912: 226)
4
. 
                                                 
3
 I refer, on one hand, to internalist representationalism, 
which conceives of qualia as merely subjective 
properties of mental states and, on the other hand, to 
externalist representationalism (for e.g. in Fred Dretske) 
and direct realism (for e.g. in James Gibson), which 
conceive of qualia as external properties of mind-
independent objects. 
4
 The expressions used by James in French are 
“monisme” and “réalité première de nature neutre”. The 
expression “neutral monism” is explicitly introduced by 
Bertrand Russell, who finally embraced it under the 
influence of James (see esp. Russell 1921). James 
develops this view in tandem with the doctrines of 
pragmatism and pluralism. However, the relationship 
between radical empiricism and metaphysical pluralism 
in James’ late philosophy is debated (see Slater 2011). 
For the purposes of this paper, we can understand 
James’ neutral monism as opposed to substance dualism 
(i.e. the thesis that mind and matter constitute two 
distinct ontological domains). However, James also 
claims that pure experience is manifold and not 
reducible to an “all form” principle, clarifying that 
“[a]lthough for fluency's sake I myself spoke early in this 
article of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say 
that there is no general stuff of which experience at 
large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are 
When interpreted as a metaphysical view, neutral 
monism is the theory according to which the immediate 
data of experience constitute the “intrinsic nature of 
ultimate reality” (Stubenberg 2014: 1). In this way, it 
constitutes a specific solution to classic metaphysical 
issues and in particular to the mind-body problem, being 
an alternative to both the Cartesian dualism of 
substances and the monistic absolutization of the 
subject (idealism) or of the object (materialism). A 
fundamental precursor of this doctrine is David Hume, 
according to whom the impressions can be conceived of 
as either subjective or objective, depending on the 
context (see Hume 1888: 202). The first full-blown form 
of neutral monism is found in Ernst Mach’s doctrine of 
elements. Mach argues that basic qualitative elements 
of experience such as hot, cold, red, etc. are neither 
exclusively physical nor psychological but rather neutral. 
As in James, according to Mach the grouping of the 
elements into the domains of physics or psychology 
depends on the direction of our investigation and on our 
practical interests.  
The reference to the affinity between James’ and 
Mach’s views is significant because it leads us to 
problematize the interpretation of the doctrine of pure 
experience in metaphysical terms. In fact, Mach 
conceives of his theory as a scientific hypothesis that is 
aimed at dealing with the problem of the relationship 
between two scientific domains of inquiry – physics and 
psychology – and he does so in the context of a criticism 
of the absolute claims of metaphysics.
5
 
Also concerning James’ doctrine of pure experience, 
we are faced with the contrast between a metaphysical 
and a non-metaphysical interpretation of it. On one 
hand, James presents his view as an ultimate account of 
the fundamental constituents of reality. On the other 
hand, James’ pragmatism and empiricism can be 
                                                                       
'natures' in the things experienced” (James 1912: 25). 
5
 This point is stressed by Paolo Parrini (2017). On the 
contrary, Erik Banks (2003; 2010) develops a 
metaphysical interpretation of Mach’s view and closely 
links it to the neutral monism of James and Russell. 
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conceived of in opposition to the absolute claims of 
metaphysics and therefore in opposition to metaphysical 
realism, i.e. to he idea that we can reach knowledge of 
an absolute reality “in itself”. It is also in order to 
address this ambiguity that is useful to compare James’ 
view with Husserl’ phenomenology. 
 
3. The concept of experience in phenomenology 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology is a radical inquiry into the 
nature of experience and has its roots in the empiricist 
tradition. Husserl conceives of Hume as a fundamental 
forerunner of phenomenology who, however, “almost 
sets foot upon its domain, but with blinded eyes” 
(Husserl 1983: 118). In fact, Husserl combines the 
empiricist faithfulness to phenomena with a 
transcendental standpoint that seeks to account for the 
conditions of possibility of the manifestation of 
phenomena. In pursuing this objective, the 
phenomenological inquiry into the nature of experience 
reveals a fundamental co-implication of subject and 
object.  
This central aspect of the phenomenological view is 
enclosed in the concept of intentionality, which, as we 
have seen, is in accordance with James’ analysis of the 
mind in terms of cognitive functions in the Principles. On 
the other hand, the epistemological dualism that is 
expressed by the concept of intentionality clashes with 
James’ late philosophy and its critique of all forms of 
dualism. In particular, James’ late view opposes also the 
functional dualism that is theorized by neokantian 
philosophers. According to them, “experience is 
indefeasibly dualistic in structure” and a functional but 
not substantial duality of “subject-plus-object” 
constitutes the minimal element of experience (James 
1912: 5). However, this functional dualism is an essential 
aspect of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. 
This contrast between James’ radical empiricism and 
Husserl’s phenomenology emerges when we consider 
Husserl’s account of perception in the transcendental 
framework of Ideas I. We have seen that in Essays James 
considers the sensations as pure experiences that are 
neutral, i.e. neither subjective nor objective. The 
phenomenological account of perception also clashes 
with the one-sidedness of internalist 
representationalism on one hand and externalism or 
direct realism on the other hand, which conceive of the 
qualitative properties (colors, sounds, etc.) as, 
respectively, merely subjective properties of mental 
states or objective properties of a mind-independent 
world. However, the specificity of Husserl’s account of 
perception is that it admits both “immanent” sensations 
and “transcendent” sensory properties and develops an 
analysis of the intentional correlation between them. In 
the transcendental framework of Ideas I, the perceptual 
act consists in the intentional animation of sensations 
(hyletic contents) by means of which the perceptual 
object, with its sensory properties, is constituted. This is 
a central aspect of the phenomenological view that 
seems to distance it from James’ doctrine of pure 
experience.  
This point can be also highlighted by looking at the 
relationship between the philosophies of Husserl and 
Mach, whose point of view is very close to James’ radical 
empiricism. While stressing the influence of Mach on the 
genesis of phenomenology (see Fisette 2012: 53ff.), 
Husserl repeatedly criticizes him for not acknowledging 
the distinction between immanent sensations and 
transcendent sensory properties (Husserl 2001b: 90; see 
Fisette 2012: 62, 64). According to Husserl, the flaw in 
Mach’s view is that it reduces – as do the British 
empiricists – transcendent objects to sensory contents 
and for this reason, despite Mach’s anti-metaphysical 
claims, his theory is a type of phenomenalism. According 
to Husserl, what is missing in Mach’s doctrine of 
elements is the theory of intentionality as correlation 
subjective-objective (Fisette 2012: 65). The same 
criticism of Mach’s doctrine of neutral elements, from 
the standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology, can be also 
applied to James’ doctrine of pure experience. 
At the same time, from the standpoint of James’ late 
philosophy, Husserl’s “phenomenology of constitution” 
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can be considered as an overly intellectualist philosophy 
that loses contact with the experience of a concrete 
human being in its pragmatic relation with the others 
and the world. This kind of criticism of Husserl has been 
put forward by various authors, especially after the 
publication of the first volume of the Ideas (for e.g. in 
Heidegger 1992) and it can also be expressed in the 
terms of a pragmatist critique of the alleged 
intellectualism and residual dualism of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. For this reason, 
Wilshire (1969: 40) sees in James’ pragmatism an 
alternative to Husserl’s alleged inclination to idealism 
and he does so by likening James’ late philosophy with 
the existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Kessler (1978) also argues that 
there is an “existential divergence” between the 
philosophies of James and Husserl and that, for this 
reason, James’ late philosophy is closer to Sartre’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. However, 
in the following pages I shall argue that a deeper look at 
the development of Husserl’s phenomenology shows 
that the opposition to James’ radical empiricism is not 
that radical and that they do have some significant 
points in common. 
 
4. Genetic phenomenology 
 
The alleged intellectualistic and dualistic aspects of 
Husserl’s phenomenology can be seen to be in opposition 
to James’ radical empiricism. However, I would like to 
show that the transition from the epistemological dualism 
of the Principles to the doctrine of pure experience, with 
its deconstruction of the subject-object duality, is a 
movement that can be seen at play also in the transition 
from static to genetic phenomenology. In fact, the fore-
mentioned aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology belong to 
a level of the phenomenological inquiry that Husserl 
himself conceives of as not “ultimate” but as “preliminary” 
to further developments. The investigation of the dual 
structure of experience, by means of the notion of 
intentionality, constitutes the starting point of the 
phenomenological inquiry but it is also developed within a 
fundamental delimitation. This is because this inquiry 
abstains from the investigation of the inner temporal 
unfolding of the experiences (Erlebnisse) and considers 
them rather as unitary acts of perception, imagination, 
thought, etc. In this way, the experiences are turned into 
mental “states” that are intentionally directed towards 
objects. This level of inquiry is what Husserl calls “static 
phenomenology” and that methodologically precedes 
“genetic phenomenology” (see Husserl 2001: 644 ff.), 
which investigates the deeper temporal and processual 
nature of the stream of experiences. Husserl explicitly 
distinguishes between static and genetic phenomenology 
in his late works, but he implicitly presents this distinction 
already in Ideas I, where he claims that: “The level of 
consideration to which we are confined […] abstains from 
descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate 
consciousness which constitutes all […] temporality as 
belongs to mental processes, and instead takes mental 
processes as they offer themselves as unitary temporal 
processes in reflection on what is immanent.” (Husserl 
1983: 171). The subsequent broadening of the inquiry in 
genetic phenomenology “deepens” the analysis of the 
dual structure of experience, investigating the genesis of 
the intentional correlation between subject and object. 
At this point, it is useful to compare the genetic 
analysis of experience in phenomenology with James’ 
doctrine of pure experience. In fact, from the standpoint 
of genetic phenomenology, at the heart of experience we 
find a flow of “primal impressions” (Urimpressionen) that 
are neither subjective nor objective, being the primal 
dimension on the basis of which the subject and the 
object are co-constituted in reciprocal dependence. This is 
because, according to Husserl, the subject of experience is 
not a pre-constituted substance but it comes to be self-
constituted in the process of constituting objects. Genetic 
phenomenology investigates the “genesis of the 
constitution” (Husserl 2001, 644) that is at the same time 
the genesis of the “monadic individuality” (Husserl 2001: 
635). The notion of “monad” refers to the concrete 
subject of experience, which “necessarily has the form of 
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the unity of becoming, of a unity of unflagging genesis” 
(Husserl 2001: 635). Therefore, according to Husserl – and 
in contrast to an alleged residual Cartesianism in his view 
– the subject of experience is not a substance but an 
ongoing process that emerges in correlation with 
objectivity in the process of experience. On this point, 
Husserl agrees with James who, already in the Principles, 
tends to reduce the subject to a “vanishing point” (Dewey 
1940: 589; see Schutz 1941: 443). In particular, in the 
Essays James clarifies that, when claiming that 
“consciousness” does not exist, he means “only to deny 
that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most 
emphatically that it does stand for a function” (James 
1912: 5). 
Therefore, in the light of the genetic inquiry in 
phenomenology, Husserl seems to admit a “neutral” 
dimension of experience, which precedes the functional 
distinction into subject and object. The flow of 
impressions can be conceived of as a primal dimension of 
experience that precedes the subject-object duality, as in 
James’ concept of “pure experience”. In this way, by 
comparing Husserl’s genetic phenomenology with James’ 
doctrine of pure experience, we see that both lead to the 
deconstruction of the subject-object duality, finding at its 
heart a process of co-emergence of the subject and the 
object of experience. This is an outcome of Husserl’s 
phenomenology that is stressed, for instance, by Francisco 
Varela, who argues that the phenomenological reduction 
“does not sustain the basic subject-object duality but 
opens into a field of phenomena where it becomes less 
and less obvious how to distinguish between subject and 
object (this is what Husserl called the ‘fundamental 
correlation’).” (Varela 1996: 339). For this reason, 
Husserl’s phenomenology “does not seek to oppose the 
subjective to the objective, but to move beyond the split 
into their fundamental correlation.” (Varela 1996: 339)
6
. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Concerning Varela’s acknowledgement of a pragmatic 
dimension of phenomenology see Pace Giannotta 
(2017). 
However, at this point I would like to consider also 
some significant differences between James’ and 
Husserl’s views of the impressional core of experience. 
First of all, James seems to conceive of pure experiences 
as the object of an immediate acquaintance or intuition 
that precedes any theoretical reflection. It is this 
reflection that introduces the duality of knower-known. 
On the contrary, Husserl finds the impressional 
dimension of experience through a regressive analysis 
that takes, as its starting point, the dual structure of 
intentionality. The phenomenological inquiry begins with 
epochè and reduction and therefore with a detachment 
from the ordinary and pragmatic “immersion” in the 
lifeworld. The latter concept, which is central in Husserl’s 
late works and is very consonant to James’ pragmatism, 
is the outcome and not the starting point of the 
transcendental phenomenological inquiry. Yet, we can 
say that, despite this difference in method, both Husserl 
and James reach a similar outcome, finding in the 
qualitative core of experience a neutral dimension from 
which the subject and the object are co-constituted in 
the cognitive process. 
 
5. Form and matter 
 
In the light of the comparison of James’ view with 
Husserl’s phenomenology, we can now look back at the 
issue of the relationship between the doctrine of pure 
experience and metaphysics. We can do so by asking if 
Husserl’s view concerning the impressional genesis of 
experience can be conceived of in terms of a 
metaphysical form of neutral monism. I shall argue that 
it is not so and that the motivations against this 
conclusion can also be applied to James’ doctrine of pure 
experience. 
In developing the phenomenological analysis of 
experience, Husserl takes the Kantian conception of the 
cognitive process in terms of an essential intertwining of 
form and matter. As is known, in Kant’s view, the 
knowledge of a certain phenomenon requires the 
synthetic unification of a manifold of sensations through 
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functions of subjectivity. For this reason, Kant denies the 
possibility of attaining knowledge of pure matter that is 
not structured by the forms of our cognitive faculties. 
The appearance of a sensible world is not an immediate 
acknowledgment of a pure “given”, because certain 
features of our sensibility and understanding necessarily 
give form to sensory matters. Husserl takes this 
conception of experience as an intertwining of form and 
matter, developing it in his own way.  
Within genetic phenomenology, this interplay of 
form and matter is investigated at the fundamental level 
of time-consciousness – within an inquiry that was 
deeply influenced by James’ chapter in Principles on the 
“stream of thought”. Husserl highlights the fact that the 
field of consciousness has a certain structure. In fact, 
each moment of an experience is constituted by a new 
primal impression that is intrinsically joined to two 
primal forms of intentionality: retentions and 
protentions (Husserl 2001a: 115ff.). By developing this 
analysis of the temporal unity of consciousness, Husserl 
agrees with the Jamesian concept of the “specious 
present” and with its account of it in terms of fringes. 
Husserl argues that it is in virtue of retentions and 
protentions that the living present is not limited to the 
now-point but has a temporal “thickness”, as it includes 
the retention of past impressions and the protention 
towards expected ones (see Gurwitsch 1946; Zahavi 
2010: 320 ff.). In the light of this analysis, the sensory 
matters turn out to be always given within a temporal 
horizon, which requires the intentionality of retentions 
and protentions. Primal impression, retention and 
protention constitute the non-independent parts of a 
whole, i.e. the continuous flow of consciousness. This 
means that in Husserl’s account of time-consciousness 
the primal, qualitative dimension of experience is always 
structured through the proto-intentional animation of 
the impressions. I would like to stress an implication of 
this analysis that is shared by both James’ and Husserl’s 
views, against reductionist empiricism. That is: we do 
not find pure impressions of “redness”, “coldness”, 
“heaviness”, etc. but an enduring flow of these 
impressions that are continuously intertwined with 
retentions and protentions. The "pure" impression 
becomes a limit that we achieve by analysing the 
concrete flow of experience, which is constituted by 
sensory matters that are “formed” by the intentionality 
of retentions and protentions. This is a first level of the 
intertwining of form and matter in phenomenology that 
goes against the possibility of turning the sensory matter 
into an absolute, ontological domain that would be 
known as it is “in itself” (i.e. metaphysical realism). 
The essential interplay between form and matter is 
also present at higher levels of the constitution of 
objectivity, in relation to the concrete constitution of the 
subject of experience. In the context of the genetic 
phenomenological inquiry, Husserl develops a 
conception of the embodiment of the field of 
consciousness, acknowledging the essential role of 
bodily structures and functions in constituting the form 
and the matter of experience. As is known, according to 
the phenomenological doctrine of eidetic seeing, when 
perceiving individual objects and events we can grasp 
essences that are arranged in a hierarchy of genus and 
species (e.g. the relationship between a certain shade of 
red, the genus “color” and its relationship of bilateral 
foundation with spatial extension). In the light of this 
doctrine, the “given” is not “amorphous” but has a 
structure that is expressed by material a priori 
judgments. In the context of genetic phenomenology, 
Husserl argues that these material a priori judgements 
are based on the sensory intuition of a “concrete 
subjectivity” and, for this reason, they are “contingent a 
priori” (Husserl 1969: 26). This is because the capability 
to grasp the eidetic truths expressed by material a priori 
judgments is based on the bodily “make-up of the 
experiencing subject” (Husserl 1989: 56). Our capacity to 
perceive, for e.g., sounds and colors, depends on this 
makeup of the human body (see Husserl 1969: 26-27). In 
fact, we must acknowledge that the sensory matters 
that lie at the basis of the constitution of objects are 
relative to specific senses, which vary between different 
animal species. Following Thomas Nagel's famous 
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example of the bat (Nagel 1974), we can point to the 
experience of other beings with different senses, 
without being able to acquire any intuitive knowledge 
about it. Nagel refers to the fact that third-person 
knowledge of the physiology of echolocation doesn’t 
give us knowledge of “what it is like” to perceive through 
this perceptual system. Precisely, what we cannot know 
is the subjective, felt qualitative experience that is 
associated with this form of perception. From the 
standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology, in the light of 
its theory of the cognitive role of intuition, the reason 
why we cannot know what it is like to be a bat is that we 
cannot give an “intuitive filling” to the third-person 
description of the bat’s perception by means of 
echolocation. Husserl puts forward this thesis when 
referring to the case of a blind person who cannot have 
any “intuitive clarity about the sense of color” on the 
basis of a third-person knowledge about the process of 
vision (Husserl 1999, 63; see also p. 30). This analysis 
thus reveals another level of the intertwining of form 
and matter in the process of the co-constitution of 
subject and object, which is based on certain features of 
the bodily constitution of a living being. In this way, in 
contrast to the metaphysical absolutization of the 
elements of experience that makes of them elements of 
an absolute reality, genetic phenomenology 
acknowledges certain transcendental structures that 
make possible our experience and that depend on 
specific features of the living body.
7
 
Therefore, there is a peculiar circularity in the 
process of co-constitution, because constituted features 
of a living being are conditions of the possibility of the 
constitution of objects. This circularity is assumed as 
fundamental by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose notions 
such as flesh and chiasm (Merleau-Ponty 1968) refer to 
the living body as locus of an intertwining of subject and 
object.
8
 Kessler (1978) stresses the closeness between 
                                                 
7
 On this point, see especially the analyses concerning 
the role of the body in the constitution in Ideas II 
(Husserl 1989). 
8
 This circularity is also placed at the heart of the 
Merleau-Ponty’s and James’ philosophy, by opposing the 
concept of “pragmatic body”, which he finds in these 
two authors, to Husserl’s concept of “transcendental 
ego”. However, various scholars have also stressed the 
closeness between Merleau-Ponty’s and Husserl’s 
phenomenology (see Zahavi 2002), finding already in 
Husserl’s investigation of the living body a 
“phenomenology of the flesh” (Bernet 2013). According 
to these readings, Merleau-Ponty’s investigation of the 
embodiment of consciousness is continuous with 
Husserl’s inquiry. 
In particular, Merleau-Ponty develops the 
phenomenological analysis of the role of the body in the 
process of co-constitution of subject and object by 
means of the concept of body schema. Samantha 
Matherne (2016) argues that, with this notion in mind, 
Merleau-Ponty develops, in a non-intellectualist 
direction, the Kantian doctrine of schematism (Matherne 
2016: 195). Doing so, Merleau-Ponty redefines the 
Kantian notions of “transcendental” and “a priori” in an 
embodied direction, by conceiving of them as the 
expressions of “the formal features of our facticity, 
without which there would be no experience.” 
(Matherne 2016, 217). Merleau-Ponty, therefore, 
stresses the dependence of transcendental conditions 
on contingent features of our bodily constitution, seeing 
in them formal features of our facticity that make 
possible the manifestation of phenomena and, in so, 
agreeing with Husserl’s concept of the contingent a 
priori.  
According to this direction of inquiry that is present 
in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the 
qualitative and “neutral” core of experience is 
constituted by sensory matters that are necessarily 
                                                                       
enactive approach of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
(1991), who combine Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology with the relationism of the 
Madhyamaka philosophy. The central thesis of the 
enactive approach in this original formulation is that 
“Knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation 
to each other through mutual specification or dependent 
coorigination.” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991: 
150). 
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structured by forms that depend on the embodiment of 
a living being. In my opinion, this inquiry on the 
intertwining of form and matter of experience 
complements James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to 
its development in empirical and not metaphysical 
terms. This is because, in the light of this analysis, we 
cannot conceive of “pure experiences” as the elements 
of an absolute reality that would be known as it is “in 
itself”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The comparison between Husserl’s genetic development 
of phenomenology and James’ radical empiricism has 
revealed significant points of contact between them. In 
fact, they both find at the heart of experience a 
qualitative core that precedes and is at the basis of the 
functional distinction between subject and object. 
However, a certain interpretation of James’ view as a 
metaphysics of pure experience could lead us to 
conceive of it as a form of neutral monism that attains 
knowledge of ultimate reality. On the contrary, the 
phenomenological investigation of the relationship 
between form and matter at the fundamental level of 
the co-constitution of subject and object shows that 
sensory matters do not constitute a pure given, being 
always structured through forms that depend on the 
concrete constitution of a living being. In this way, 
Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement 
James’ doctrine of pure experience leading us to develop 
it in empirical and not metaphysical terms. 
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